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Contradictions on Chile 


Setidie Report , Earlier Testimony Disagree 

/ 'h-xh? 

By Laurence Stern 

Washington Post StaM Writer 

Testifying under oath before 
the Senate Multinational 
Corporations Subcommittee, 
former U.S. Ambassador to 
Chile Edward Malcolm Korry 
made a series of seemingly 
unqualified disclaimers of 
American intervention in the 
1970 Chilean presidential 

Among his assertions on 
March 27, 1973, were these: 

“ ... It was obvious from 
the historical record that we 
did not act in any manner that 
reflected a hard line; that the 
United States gave no support 
to any electoral candidate . . . 
that the United States did not 
seek to pressure, subvert, 
influence a single member of 
the Chilean congress at any 
time in the entire four years of 
my stay,. * . w 

The revelations of the 
Senate Intelligence committee 
in its assassination report last 
week contradict this and other 
assertions sworn to by Korry 2 
** years ago. 

The committee report 
quotes, for example, a 
message Korry sent to 
President Eduardo Frei, long 
a favorite of Korry and the 
American diplomatic 

The message, seeking to 
encourage Frei to join a secret 
U.S. plan of political in- 
tervention to deny the 1970 
Chilean election to Salvador 
Allende, said: “Frei should 
know that not a nut or bolt will 
be allowed to reach Chile 
under Allende. Once Allende 
comes to power we shall do all 
within our power to condemn 
Chile and the Chileans to 
utmost deprivation and 
poverty, a policy designed for 
a long time to come to ac- 
celerate the hard features of a 
Communist society in Chile 

Statements issued in behalf 
of President Nixon that the 
United States played no in- 
terventionist role in Chile in 
1970 also were strongly 
challenged by the Senate 
committee’s evidence of a 

presidentially ordered covert 
political war against the 
socialist Allende. 

So was the testimony of 
former Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers; his suc- 
cessor, Henry A. Kissinger; 
former CIA Director Richard 
M. Helms; former Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs Charles 
Meyer and other State 
Department spokesmen. 

Meyer commented earlier 
this week, “I have the feeling I 
was part of a James Bond 
scenario and didn't know it at 
the time.” * 

Concerning Korry, the 
Senate intelligence committee 
reported that the- former 
ambassador recommended to 
Washington a plan for “a 
$500,000 effort in (the Chilean) 
congress to persuade certain 
shifts in voting on 24 October, 
1970." That was the date of the 
Chilean runoff election made 
necessary because Allende 
failed to win a majority in the 

See CHILE, A4, CoL 1 


CHILE, From Al; ; 

popular election Sept. 4. 

The “Forty Committee, M 
the government's top decision- 
making body for covett 
operations, authorized 
$350,000 to';be spent by the 
Central Intelligence Agency to 
bribe menbers of the Chilean 
congress to oppose Alleride 
and overturn the results of the. 
popular election. The money 
•was never spent, however, 
because of fears that the CIA’s 
complicity \frouId leakoflt;' r * 

The S enale report gave new 
significance to an internal ITT 
document that vyas first 
reported by columnist Jack 
Anderson in March, 1972. It 
alluded to a Sept. 15,d970 % - 

was In a very minor way in- 
volved in the 1970 election and 
since then we have absolutely 
stayed away from any coups. 
Our efforts in Chile were to 
strengthen the democratic 

4 - .. . ® 1 fc,,v wviiuwi OUL 

message from the State political parties and give them 

ry in a basis for winning the elec- 

to Korry 


That memo, from ITT field 
operatives Hal Hendrix and. 

Ptbbert Berrelez, reported^to 
high executives of the firm': 

“The big push has begun in 
ompucuv would leak -Chile..... to assure a 

There ‘was another major cbngrestfional victory for 

contradicLidn. Accorded to Jor 8 e Alessandri on October 

the Senate report:* -Korry \ 24, ‘as part of wbat has been 
received a go-ahead from v dubbed **the - “Alessandri 
"Washington after a Sept. 14, Formula*’ ,.to prevent Chile 

1970 National Security .Council from becoming a Communist 

meeting to implement what state , Late Tuesday night was speaking of the CD 

was called the “Rube Gold- < s ?P l - «);* Ambassador covert promotion of a coup 

berg” gambit to deny the 1970 Edward Ko*;ry finally 19 '°; 

election to Allende. This plant- 4 r ®^ eiv ^ a message from the -Testifying before t 
called for the diversion of State Department giving him 
votes in the Chilean congress the green light to move in the 
to the candidacy of Jorge name of President Nixon. The 
AI ,f message gave him maximum 

authority to do all possible — 

Short '*of a Dominican 
Republic-type action — to 
keep ^Ilehde Tfom taking 

stitutionally free to’ succeed 0 A 

himself in the presidehcy. -K^rJ t«t^edin the Senate 
(Chile’s constitution bars a Multinational Corporations 
president /rom succeeding Su committee inquiry that 
himself.) ^ S v., 8 " there was no green light or 

In his 1973 testimony to the"" JV * 

subcommittee investigating Bu ?? declined- to- elaborate 
efforts $y International on h,s ,n structions from, 

TeleDhono and Tplpor'inh Washington on the ground that panics uwure ur 

jt would be impro^r foe hia, after Sept. 8 , the date of the, 

jd to discuss the content of an popu lac election) „ > • 

PXPCIlHvP rnmirtiinir-ofinn “Ac Iho Procirlonf clalo/1 

Alessandri, a conservative 
and aging politician, ^who 
would then resign, leaving the 
incumbent Christian 
Democrat, Frei, con- 

Allende in 1970, Korry said 
that the United States “did not 
get involved in the so-called 
Alessandri formula . . . “ 

But a CIA memo, disclosed 
in a footnpte to the Senate 
commit Lee* report, spelled out 
Korry’s role in the Alessandri 
formula. J 

“Ambassador Korry was 
asked to go directly to 
President Frei to see if he 
would be willing to commit 
himself to this line of action. A 
contingency of $250,000 was 
approved for ’covert support 
of projects which Frei or his 
trusted team deem im- 
portant.’ It was further agreed 
that a propaganda campaign 
be undertaken by the agency 
(CIA) to focus on the damage 
of an Allende takeover.’* 

Korry said yesterday that “I 
stand by every statement I 
have made to the committee 
and to the press.” He added 
that he will testify publicly at 
the committee’s hearings on 
Chile next week. 

. tion in 1976. . . 

Thomas Karamessines, CIA 
Deputy Director for Plans 
(covert operations), testified 
to the Senate intelligence 
committee that “Kissinger 
left no doubt in my mind that 
be was under the heaviest of 
pressure to get this ac- 
complished and he in turn was 
placing us under the heaviest 
of pressures to get It ac- 
complished.'' Karamessines 
was speaking of the CIA’s 
‘ i coup by 

— ary in 19^ 

-Testifying before the 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on March 22, 1972, 
Rogers said: “The United 
States government did not 
engage in improper activities 
in Chile.” 

—Meyer, testifying before 
the Senate Multinational 
Corporations Subcommittee 
on March 17, 1973, said: “The 
policy of the government, Mr. 
Chairman, was that there 
would be no intervention in the . 
political affairs of Chile. We 
were consistent in that.we 
financed no candidates, no 
political parties before or 

As the President stated 
... ’we deal with govern- 
ments as they are’ ... We 
were religiously and 
scrupulously adhering to the 
policy of the government of 
" ' ■ of 

executive communication. 

Sept. 15, 1970. was the day, 
according to the Senate in- 
telligence committee report, 
that President Nixon ordered 
Helms to involve the CIA in . 
promoting a military toup the United States 
d’etat* in Chile at a meeting nonintervention.” 
with Kissinger and Attorney This .week Meyer 
General John N. Mitchell. 

Other statements by leading 
administration officials that 
appear to be contradicted by 
the evidence of the Senate 
report were these: 

—In his 1972 foreign policy 
report lo'Congress, President 
Nixon, in a reference to Chile, 
said the United States deals 
"realistically with govern- 
ments as they are — right and 
left.” His administration, the 
President said, pursued a 
policy of ’’non-intervention.” 
—During his confirmation 
hearings as Secretary of State 
in September, 1973, Kissinger 
said that “the CIA was heavily 
involved in 1964 in the election, 

■L. sa Id 

ruefully: “I never felt then nor 
now that I was perjuring or 
lying. The degree to which I 
was talking about what I knew 
— and about what I didn’t 
know — will have to be